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COMMENTS
CEREMONIAL INVOCATIONS AT PUBLIC HIGH
SCHOOL EVENTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JAMES J. DEAN
W HILE it is clear that conducting vocal prayers in public school
classrooms violates the establishment clause,' the Supreme
Court has not addressed the use of ceremonial invocations2 to open
extracurricular public school events. The Court has, however, upheld
the practice of opening state legislative sessions with an invocation.'
Against this background, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals recently addressed the constitutionality of using ceremonial
invocations in the public school context and reached contrary conclu-
sions concerning the analytical standard that should be applied. Judge
Merritt, writing for a divided three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit in
Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools,4 concluded that the standards
articulated by the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Chambers5 for examin-
ing legislative invocations should determine the constitutionality of us-
ing ceremonial invocations to open public high school graduation
exercises. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit in Jager v. Douglas
County School District6 held that the three-prong test articulated by
the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman7 governed the issue of using invoca-
1. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2. Although the term "invocation" could be used to refer to a short speech not said in the
form of a prayer, in this Comment the term is defined to mean "the act of invoking or calling
upon a deity, spirit, etc., for aid, protection, inspiration, or the like; supplication," or "a form
of prayer invoking God's presence, said [especially] at the beginning of a public ceremony."
RANDOM HousE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 703 (rev'd ed. 1979). For purposes of this Comment,
therefore, the term does not include mere inspirational opening comments which are not said in
the form of a prayer.
3. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
4. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987). Judge Merritt's conclusion that Marsh "governed" the
issue in Stein has been characterized as a holding of the Sixth Circuit, see Jager v. Douglas
County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 829 n.9 (I Ith Cir. 1989); Comment, Stein v. Plainwell Com-
munity Schools-The American Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 15 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 533, 538 (1988). However, this characterization is inaccurate. See infra note 33.
5. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
6. 862 F.2d 824 (llth Cir. 1989).
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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tions to open high school football games, and concluded that Marsh
had no application. Although both courts found violations of the es-
tablishment clause,8 Judge Merritt's application of Marsh left open
the possibility that a properly worded invocation would be constitu-
tional, whereas the Eleventh Circuit's approach under Lemon appar-
ently would invalidate all invocation practices regardless of the
content of the particular prayers involved.
This Comment examines the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits' ap-
proaches to determine which of these analytical frameworks should be
employed when evaluating the constitutionality of using ceremonial
invocations in the public schools. The Comment then applies this
analysis to determine whether the practice of having invocations to
open public school events itself is unconstitutional, or whether a prop-
erly worded ceremonial invocation may be constitutional.
I. ALTERNATIVE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE APPROACHES: LEMON AND
MARSH
The test traditionally applied in establishment clause cases, and the
one applied by the vast majority of courts addressing the ceremonial
invocation issue in the public school context, 9 is the three-prong test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.'0 Lemon
involved an establishment clause challenge to Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island statutes which provided financial assistance to church-related
elementary and secondary schools." In addressing the constitutional-
ity of these statutes, the Court articulated the inquiry which would
become the Lemon three-prong test: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' 2
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion."
9. See Jager, 862 F.2d at 824 (invocations before high school football games); Stein v.
Plainwell Community Schools, 610 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th
Cir. 1987) (high school graduation invocations); Berlin v. Okaloosa County School Dist., No.
PCA 87-30450-RV (N.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 1988) (1988 WL 85937) (invocations before high school
football games) (unpublished opinion); Graham v. Central Community School Dist., 608 F.
Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (high school graduation invocations); Bennet v. Livermore Unified
School Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Ct. App. 1987) (high school graduation
invocations).
10. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
11. Id. at606.
12. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). Although both statutes contained provisions to ensure
that aid would not be used. to further the religious aims of the schools, the Court ultimately
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During the years following the Supreme Court's decision in Lemon,
the three-prong Lemon test achieved widespread acceptance as the ap-
propriate analysis to apply in establishment clause cases. Since its for-
mulation, the Court has departed from the Lemon test only once. 3
This departure occurred in Marsh v. Chambers,14 where the Court
considered an establishment clause challenge to Nebraska's practice of
opening its state legislative sessions with an invocation by a paid cler-
gyman. The majority in Marsh relied on the original intent of the
framers, and never mentioned the Lemon test. The Court reasoned
that since the framers of the first amendment also authorized paid
legislative chaplains to open their sessions with prayers, the framers
must not have considered this practice an establishment of religion. 5
The Court then concluded that since the establishment clause could
not be more restrictive on the states than on the federal government,
the same practice before state legislative sessions must also be consti-
tutional. 6 Finally, the Court weighed the specific attributes of the Ne-
braska practice 7 against the historical background and concluded that
these factors did not serve to invalidate the Nebraska practice. 8
II. THE SIXTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACHES
The Supreme Court's decisions in Lemon and Marsh represent two
different approaches to establishment clause cases. Thus, a threshold
question concerning the ceremonial invocation issue is which of these
conflicting approaches should govern the inquiry.
struck the statutes based on the third prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 613-14. The Court rea-
soned that since the programs presented a risk that the government aid would be used to support
the religious purposes of the schools, the government supervision necessary to prevent this from
occurring would have to be substantial. The Court then concluded that the level of state surveil-
lance required created an impermissible degree of entanglement between church and state. See
id. at 615-22.
13. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 n.4 (1987). Notwithstanding the
Court's statement in Edwards, commentators have read the Court's decision in Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), to have established a separate test from the traditional Lemon analy-
sis even though the Court in Lynch purported to apply Lemon. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the
Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984
DUKE L.J. 770, 782-83 (characterizing Lynch as establishing a new "any more than" test); Note,
Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1245 (1986) (Lynch relies on
Marsh to create an "acknowledgement exception" to Lemon) [hereinafter Civil Religion].
14. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
15. Id. at 790.
16. Id. at 790-91.
17. The Nebraska practice was challenged on the specific grounds that a clergyman of one
denomination had been selected for 16 years, that he was being paid at public expense, and that
he offered prayers in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Id. at 792-93.
18. Id.
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A. The Sixth Circuit's Approach
Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools'9 involved graduation exer-
cises at the Plainwell and Portage Central high schools in Western
Michigan near Kalamazoo. Invocations and benedictions had been in-
cluded regularly as a part of the Plainwell High School commence-
ments since 1980,20 and as a part of the Portage Central High School
commencements for fifteen years before Stein was litigated. 2' Attend-
ance at both commencements was voluntary, and receipt of a diploma
was not conditioned upon attendance. 22 At the Plainwell commence-
ment, students were to be chosen from a group of volunteers to de-
liver the prayers. The students would be advised to keep the prayers
brief, but would not be given any instructions regarding the content of
the prayers. 23 At Portage Central High School, the graduating seniors
were permitted to organize and develop the content of their com-
mencement exercises, and had regularly elected to include an invoca-
tion and benediction as a part of their graduation ceremony. 24 Senior
class representatives traditionally had chosen local ministers to deliver
the prayers. 25 The minister generally was instructed to keep the prayer
nondenominational and short, but the content of the prayer would
not be previewed by either the school administration or the senior
class representatives. 26
The district court in Stein noted that the graduation invocation is-
sue "[fell] into a grey area of establishment clause doctrine" between
the unconstitutional practice of daily classroom prayer on the one
hand, and the constitutional practice of invocations before state legis-
latures on the other. 27 However, the district court showed no hesita-
tion in deciding which analytical framework should be applied. 2 The
district court reasoned that the Lemon analysis was appropriate, 29 not-
ing however, that the Supreme Court recently had stated its unwilling-
ness to be strictly bound by the Lemon test.3 0 The district court then
applied Lemon and concluded that the practice of opening high school
19. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
20. Id. at 1411 (Wellford, J., dissenting).





26. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 610 F. Supp. 43, 45 (W.D. Mich. 1985), rev'd,
822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
27. Id. at 46.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
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graduation ceremonies with an invocation passed all three prongs of
the Lemon test.31
The plaintiffs in Stein appealed the district court's decision. Al-
though the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and held the invo-
cation at issue unconstitutional,3 2 the three-judge panel in Stein was
divided on the appropriate analytical framework to apply to the is-
sue.33 However, Judge Merritt's majority opinion concluded that the
invocations and benedictions at issue were governed by the standards
articulated by the Supreme Court in Marsh. Judge Merritt reasoned
that since the graduation ceremonies were analogous to the legislative
and judicial sessions referred to in Marsh, and the invocations served
the same solemnizing function as did the prayers in Marsh, the Marsh
analysis should apply.3 4 Although he did not expressly address the
question of whether the Lemon test should be applied to the issue,
Judge Merritt did address the question implicitly by distinguishing
graduation ceremonies from the classroom setting. Judge Merritt rea-
soned that the public nature of the graduation ceremony and the pres-
ence of parents minimized the potential for coercion,35 and that the
special teacher-student relationship, which places the teacher in a posi-
tion of authority, was absent in the graduation ceremony context. 36
Thus, he concluded that the Marsh analysis should be applied "not-
withstanding the fact that a school function was involved." 3 7
In fashioning the standard to be applied, Judge Merritt observed
that the Supreme Court in Marsh upheld nonsectarian, nonproselytiz-
ing legislative invocations that "do not 'symbolically place the govern-
ment's seal of approval on one religious view."' 3 He then stated that
under Marsh, invocations used to open public functions, such as the
graduation ceremonies in Stein, would withstand constitutional scru-
tiny provided they did not "go beyond the 'American civil relig-
ion. ,,,939
31. Id. at 50.
32. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406, 1410 (6th Cir. 1987).
33. Judge Millburn concurred with Judge Merritt's opinion that the invocations would have
to pass the Marsh standards, but added that the invocations should also have to pass the Lemon
test. Id. Judge Wellford in dissent first measured the graduation invocation practices against a
four-factor test he developed from the Supreme Court's case law on religious practices in the
public schools and then applied the Lemon test. He concluded that the practice passed both
analyses. Id. at 1410-17 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1409.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1409-10.
38. Id. at 1409 (citation omitted).
39. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Judge Merritt then examined the language of the invocations and
concluded that they were not the "civil or secularized" invocations
described in Marsh, and thus did not pass the Marsh test.40 Since the
prayers employed the language of Christian theology and some "ex-
pressly invoked the name of Jesus as the Savior," he concluded that
the prayers "symbolically placed the government's seal of approval on
one religious view," the Christian view. 41 Thus, Judge Merritt con-
cluded that the prayers at issue violated the establishment clause.4 2
Significantly, however, Judge Merritt's decision preserved the possi-
bility that a properly worded invocation could withstand establish-
ment clause scrutiny.
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Approach
Jager v. Douglas County School District43 involved invocations be-
fore home football games at Douglas County High School in Douglas
County, Georgia. The practice had been followed at the high school
since as early as 1947. From the early 1970's through 1986, a Presby-
terian clergyman recruited ministers to deliver the invocations through
the Douglas County Ministerial Association, whose membership con-
sisted exclusively of Protestant Christian ministers." The invocation
speakers often began with the words, "let us bow our heads" or "let
us pray" and often closed with the words, "in Jesus' name we
pray."45
Doug Jager, a member of the high school marching band, objected
to the practice of opening the football games with an invocation.4
Some time later, representatives of the school district and the Douglas
County Ministerial Association met with the Jagers to discuss two al-
ternative proposals to the traditional invocation practice. One alterna-
tive was a wholly secular inspirational speech. The other was an
"equal access plan" under which any student, parent, or school staff
member could submit his or her name as a potential pregame speaker.
The student government would randomly select from the list a person
to deliver a pregame address or an invocation, the content of which
would not be monitored by the school. 47
40. Id. at 1410.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 862 F.2d 824 (llth Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 826 n.2.
45. Id. at 826.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 826-27. Thus, on its face the equal access plan apparently permitted both secular
speeches and invocations.
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The Jagers initially rejected the equal access plan, stating that the
wholly secular speech was the only acceptable alternative. 41 Although
the Jagers subsequently notified the school district that they would
reconsider the equal access plan if the traditional invocation practice
ceased during the interim, the school district superintendent directed
the high school principals to proceed with the pregame invocations
pursuant to the equal access plan.49 The Jagers then filed for a tempo-
rary restraining order to enjoin the school district from conducting or
permitting religious invocations prior to any athletic events at the high
school. The district court held that the pregame invocation system as
practiced prior to the implementation of the equal access plan was
unconstitutional. Additionally, the court held the equal access plan
constitutional on its face, although it declined to address the constitu-
tionality of the plan as applied.5 0
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that the traditional invocation practice was unconstitutional, but re-
versed the district court's determination that the equal access plan was
facially valid."' The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the applicability
of Marsh to the pregame invocation issue. In contrast to Judge Mer-
ritt's conclusion in Stein that Marsh should govern the ceremonial in-
vocation issue, the Eleventh Circuit in Jager, with one judge
dissenting, 2 held Marsh inapplicable . 3 The court noted that the Su-
preme Court had recently stated that the Marsh historical approach
was inapplicable to practices in the public schools since free public
education was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution was
adopted . 4 Thus, the court concluded that the Lemon test was the ap-
propriate standard.
The court first addressed the constitutionality of the equal access
plan. The court noted that the question in applying the secular pur-
pose analysis of the Lemon test was whether the government's actual
48. Id. at 827.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 834-35.
52. Chief Judge Roney dissented from the majority's view that Marsh has no application to
the constitutionality of using invocations to open high school football games. Although he ac-
knowledged that the Supreme Court's use of the Lemon test in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985) and Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987), placed limits on the use of Marsh in the
public school context, he did not think that these limitations rendered Marsh irrelevant to estab-
lishment clause cases. Reasoning that the issue was more like the legislative invocation question
addressed in Marsh than the issues addressed in cases such as Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), he concluded that the Marsh
analysis should govern. Jager, 862 F.2d at 835-37 (Roney, J., dissenting).
53. Jager, 862 F.2d at 828-29.
54. Id. at 829 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 n.4 (1987)).
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purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion.5 The district court
concluded that the pregame invocations served both secular and reli-
gious purposes.16 However, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that since
the school district superintendent rejected the Jagers' offer to accept a
wholly secular inspirational speech that could have fulfilled all of the
secular purposes given for the challenged practice, the school district
must have been most interested in the invocation's religious purpose. 7
Thus, although the school district asserted a number of secular pur-
poses for the equal access plan, the court held that since "the preemi-
nent purpose behind having the invocations was to endorse Protestant
Christianity," the equal access plan failed the secular purpose prong
of the Lemon test. 58
The court in Jager also concluded that the equal access plan vio-
lated the effect prong of the Lemon test. The court stated that "'[t]he
effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual pur-
pose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion."' 5 9 The court concluded that "[w]hen
a religious invocation is given via a sound system controlled by school
principals and the religious invocation occurs at a school-sponsored
event at a school-owned facility, the conclusion is inescapable that the
religious invocation conveys a message that the school endorses the
religious invocation.'"'6
55. Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)).
56. Id. The pregame invocation served four purposes:
(1) to continue a longstanding custom and tradition, (2) to add a solemn and dignified
tone to the proceedings, (3) to remind the spectators and players of the importance of
sportsmanship and fair play, and (4) "to satisfy the genuine, good faith wishes on the
part of a majority of the citizens of Douglas County to publicly express support for
Protestant Christianity."
Id. (quoting the record) (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 830.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 831 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 n.42 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
60. Id. (citation omitted). The court apparently presumed that the pregame addresses would
be religious despite the fact that the equal access plan-which apparently permitted both secular
and religious openings-was examined on its face, rather than as applied. Theoretically, some of
the speakers could choose to open the football games with a secular speech, while others could
decide to offer an invocation. The court apparently recognized this theoretical possibility for it
noted that since the majority religious preference in Douglas County was Protestant Christianity,
the plan would most likely result in the continuation of Protestant Christian invocations. Id.
It is unclear whether it was proper for the Eleventh Circuit to rely on this inference when
conducting its effect prong analysis to determine the facial validity of the equal access plan. In
Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2571-77 (1988), the Court addressed the validity of the
Adolescent Family Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578 (1981), both on its face and as applied.
Although the majority in Bowen noted that the Court had seldom explicitly distinguished be-
tween facial and as applied challenges in establishment clause cases, 108 S. Ct. at 2569, the
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Although the court held that the equal access plan violated the first
two prongs of the Lemon test and was therefore unconstitutional, it
went on to address the entanglement prong of the Lemon test as well.
The court concluded that since the school district would not monitor
the content of the invocations, and the Douglas County Ministerial
Association would not select the invocation speakers or deliver any of
the invocations, the plan did not excessively entangle government with
religion .61
The court then addressed the traditional invocation practice which
had been followed prior to the implementation of the equal access
plan. The court held that the practice violated Lemon's intent prong
for the same reasons that the equal access plan did. 62 The court also
concluded that the practice violated the effect prong based on the dis-
trict court's finding that 'one of the effects of the prior practices...
was to create the appearance or impression that the school system en-
dorsed Protestant Christianity. ' ' 6s Finally, since the school system
delegated to the Douglas County Ministerial Association the authority
to select invocation speakers and to deliver the invocations, the court
held that the practice also violated the entanglement prong. 64
III. WHICH STANDARD SHOULD APPLY?
Since the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals reached
contrary conclusions concerning the analytical framework which
should be applied when determining the constitutionality of ceremo-
nial invocations in the public schools, and because the Supreme Court
has not addressed this issue, it is unclear whether a properly worded
invocation would be constitutional. To determine whether the inclu-
sion of some invocations at high school events may be constitutional,
majority concluded that separating the two issues was proper. Id. at 2570. The majority's analy-
sis of the facial validity of the Act under the effect prong focused on the text of the statute at
issue. The Court noted that although the Act's funding program expressly allowed aid to be
given to religious organizations, "nothing on the face of the Act suggests the AFLA is anything
but neutral with respect to the grantee's status as a sectarian or purely secular institution." Id. at
2573 (citing to Senate Report) (emphasis added). The majority observed further that although a
facially neutral statute could violate the effect prong if the aid flowed to pervasively sectarian
institutions, "nothing on the face of the [Act] indicates that a significant proportion of the
federal funds will be disbursed to 'pervasively sectarian' institutions." Id. at 2575 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 2583-84 & n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's use of
the distinction between facial and as applied challenges in Bowen). Based on the majority's ap-
proach in Bowen, it is unclear whether it was proper for the Eleventh Circuit to look beyond the
facial neutrality of the equal access plan when conducting its effect prong analysis.
61. Jager, 862 F.2d at 831.
62. Id. at 834.
63. Id. (quoting the record).
64. Id.
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the first question which must be addressed is what standard should be
applied. Three possible approaches emerge from the Sixth and Elev-
enth Circuits' decisions in Stein and Jager: the Marsh analysis, an
American civil religion standard purportedly based on Marsh, and the
Lemon test.
A. Marsh Analysis
Although it is not entirely clear what standard Judge Merritt actu-
ally applied to the graduation invocation at issue in Stein v. Plainwell
Community Schools, 65 he did conclude that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Marsh should govern the issue. 66 Although, as Judge Merritt
noted, invocations at graduation ceremonies share some similarities to
invocations given before state legislative sessions, 67 an examination of
the analysis in Marsh suggests that such an analysis should not be ap-
plied to ceremonial invocations in the public high school context.
The Court in Marsh applied essentially a two-step analysis to deter-
mine whether the Nebraska practice of opening its legislative sessions
with an invocation was constitutional. The Court first addressed
whether the use of legislative invocations generally violated the estab-
lishment clause, and then proceeded to examine whether the attributes
of the specific invocation system at issue passed constitutional mus-
ter. 68 In conducting the first part of its analysis concerning the use of
legislative invocations, the Court relied exclusively on an historical
analysis. The Court reasoned that since the same members of the First
Congress who voted to approve the draft of the first amendment for
submission to the states also voted to appoint and pay a chaplain to
deliver legislative invocations for each house, the framers must not
have viewed this practice as an establishment of religion. 69 The Court
then concluded that since the amendment could not be more restric-
tive on the states than on the federal government, the same practice
before state legislatures must also be constitutional. 70
65. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987). Judge Merritt did not actually apply the Marsh analysis.
See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Judge Merritt actually seemed to
apply a version of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, see infra notes 138-41 and accompany-
ing text, for he stated that the prayers should not be phrased in language which conveys to
parents and students a message that their religious beliefs are disfavored. Stein, 822 F.2d at
1410.
66. Id. at 1409.
67. Id.
68. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788-95; see Van Zandt v. Thompson, 839 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (7th
Cir. 1988) (characterizing the Supreme Court's analytical framework in Marsh as essentially this
two-step approach).
69. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
70. Id. at 790-91.
1010
CEREMONIAL INVOCA TIONS
Having determined that the practice of opening legislative sessions
with an invocation was permissible generally, the Court next ad-
dressed the specific circumstances of the Nebraska practice, namely,
that a clergyman of one denomination had been selected for sixteen
years, that he was being paid at public expense, and that he offered
prayers in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 71 Weighing these factors
against the historical background, the Court concluded that they did
not serve to invalidate the Nebraska practice.72
1. The Eleventh Circuit's Criticism of the Sixth Circuit's
Approach
The Eleventh Circuit in Jager criticized the Sixth Circuit for apply-
ing Marsh to the constitutionality of using ceremonial invocations in
the public school context." The Eleventh Circuit noted74 that the Su-
preme Court had recently stated in Edwards v. Aguillard,75 "'a histor-
ical approach [like that applied in Marsh] is not useful in determining
the proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free pub-
lic education was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution
was adopted.'- 76 The Eleventh Circuit then stated that the Sixth Cir-
cuit failed to consider the limitations placed on the Marsh historical
approach by the Supreme Court in Edwards.77
It is not clear from the Supreme Court's statement in Edwards
whether the Court was simply observing that Marsh's original intent
analysis could not be applied to practices in the public schools "since
free public education was virtually nonexistent when the Constitution
was adopted," or whether the Court also meant to foreclose the sec-
ond part of the Marsh analysis by which the Court examined the spe-
cific attributes of the Nebraska practice. Notwithstanding this
uncertainty, Jager's majority opinion suggests that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit based its criticism of the Sixth Circuit on the former construction
of the Edwards limitation. The Eleventh Circuit concluded in Jager
71. Id. at 792-93.
72. Id.
73. Jager, 862 F.2d at 829 n.9.
74. Id. at 828-29.
75. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
76. Jager, 862 F.2d at 829 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 (1987)).
But see DuPuy, Religion, Graduation, and the First Amendment: A Threat or a Shadow?, 35
DRA L. Rav. 323, 359 (1985-86) ("The recognition that, contemporaneous with the adoption
of the first amendment, public schools existed in which religious practices were common actually
lends special credence to the application of Marsh's historical exception to [graduation invoca-
tions].").
77. Jager, 862 F.2d at 829 n.9.
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that since "invocations at school-sponsored football games were non-
existent when the Constitution was adopted," the practice "does not
lend itself to Marsh's historical approach. '78 In other words, Marsh
cannot be applied to the use of invocations before public high school
football games because, unlike state legislative invocations, the fram-
ers could not have considered the constitutionality of this practice
since it did not exist when the Constitution was adopted.
Assuming this is the basis for the Eleventh Circuit's criticism of the
Sixth Circuit's approach in Stein, the criticism is not well-founded.
Judge Merritt did not purport to employ the Marsh historical ap-
proach in Stein to determine the attitudes of the framers toward the
practice of opening public high school graduation ceremonies with an
invocation. 79 Rather, he concluded that since graduation invocations
were analogous to legislative invocations, the standards utilized in
Marsh to judge the specific attributes of the practice of opening legis-
lative sessions with an invocation should apply by analogy to the prac-
tice of opening high school graduation ceremonies with an
invocation.80
2. Problems With Applying Marsh By Analogy
Although Judge Merritt's conclusion that Marsh should govern the
public school ceremonial invocation issue by analogy did not necessar-
ily exceed the Edwards limitations, applying Marsh by analogy to the
use of ceremonial invocations in the public schools still raises three
primary difficulties which suggest that Marsh should not be applied to
this issue. The first difficulty with applying Marsh by analogy is that
relying on original intent in constitutional analysis presents a number
of concerns when applied to practices actually in existence at the time,
let alone when this type of analysis is applied to other practices by
analogy. Justice Brennan pointed out three such concerns in his dis-
sent in Marsh. First, it cannot always be presumed that "[liegislators,
influenced by the passions and exigencies of the moment, the pressure
of constituents and colleagues, and the press of business" will always
carefully consider the constitutionality of every piece of legislation
78. Id. at 829.
79. Judge Merritt never discussed the history of the public schools.
80. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409. In other words, since as the Supreme Court found in Marsh,
the framers did not consider the practice of having ceremonial invocations before legislative
sessions to be unconstitutional, it is likely they also would not consider the use of ceremonial
invocations in other contexts to be per se unconstitutional. Thus, the reasoning goes, courts
should scrutinize the specific attributes of ceremonial invocation practices in the public schools
in the same manner that the Supreme Court analyzed the specific attributes of the Nebraska
legislature's invocation practice in Marsh.
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they enact.' Second, since enactment of the first amendment also re-
quired ratification by the states, the intent of the states is equally rele-
vant as that of the members of the First Congress.Y Finally, the
meaning of the Constitution has not been limited by the intent of the
framers as evidenced by their specific practices, but rather, has been
discerned from the broad purposes which the document sought to
achieve. 83 This third consideration is particularly pertinent in light of
the profound changes which have occurred in the religious composi-
tion of our nation since its founding.84 Given that these concerns exist
with respect to an historical analysis of a specific practice actually au-
thorized by the framers, they are of even greater significance concern-
ing an historical analysis which can be applied to a practice only by
analogy.
A second difficulty with applying the Marsh analysis of legislative
prayer to the use of ceremonial invocations in the public schools is
that the traditional deference shown by the courts to a legislature's
internal ordering of its own affairs is not implicated by a school
board's decision to have ceremonial invocations at extracurricular
events. Although Judge Merritt stated that the Court in Marsh "em-
phasized that ... invocations are used across the country to open leg-
islative, judicial, and administrative sessions of state legislatures, city
councils, courts and other public bodies, as well as by private institu-
tions of all kinds,"" the Court in Marsh actually only referred to in-
vocations before legislative and judicial sessions. Although the Court
in Marsh did not expressly state that its decision derived from its def-
erence to the legislature's ordering of its own internal affairs, at least
one court has read Marsh to be based in part on this principle.8 6 Since
a school district's decision to open school events with an invocation
does not implicate the deference traditionally accorded another
branch of government in the internal ordering of its own affairs, the
Marsh standards for legislative invocations should not be applied by
analogy to ceremonial invocations in the public school context.
A third difficulty with applying Marsh by analogy to ceremonial
invocations in the public schools arises from the recognition that the
81. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 814-15 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 815.
83. Id. at 817.
84. Id.
85. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987) (emphasis
added).
86. See Van Zandt v. Thompson, 839 F.2d 1215, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988) ("We read Marsh to
derive partly from ... a degree of deference to the internal spiritual practices of another branch
of government or of a branch of the government of another sovereign.").
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public elementary and secondary school system presents a "special
context" in which the Supreme Court "has been particularly vigilant
in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause." 8 7 The legis-
lature's prayers in Marsh were challenged, in part, on the basis that
they were being offered in the Judeo-Christian tradition." Having al-
ready concluded that the mere offering of a legislative invocation
without more was not constitutionally prohibited, the Court stated the
standards to be applied to the specific practice at issue: "The content
of prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indi-
cation that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or
advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief."8' 9 The
Court continued, "That being so, it is not for us ... to parse the
content of a particular prayer." 9 Thus, under Marsh a court must
first determine whether the prayer opportunity has been used to prose-
lytize or to demean any particular faith or belief. If a court finds that
the prayer opportunity has been so exploited, the court may then, but
only then, examine the language of the particular prayer at issue. This
relaxed analysis does not seem commensurate with the particular vigi-
lance the Court has indicated is appropriate when addressing estab-
lishment clause questions in the public school context.
Perhaps Judge Merritt recognized the inadequacy of the Marsh
analysis in the public school context, because his opinion in Stein es-
tablished a much stricter analysis for high school graduation invoca-
tions than the Court set forth in Marsh for legislative invocations. For
instance, Judge Merritt's application of the Marsh test to the specific
practices at issue in Stein did not even address the question of whether
the prayer opportunity was being exploited to proselytize or advance a
87. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 (1987). The Court derived this approach
from a number of its prior cases addressing activities in elementary and secondary school class-
rooms, observing that "[the state exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory
attendance requirements, and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role models and
the children's susceptibility to peer pressure." Id. (footnote omitted). That the ceremonial invo-
cations at issue in Stein and Jager did not take place in the classroom does not minimize the
concerns expressed by the Court in Edwards. Although students may not be compelled by the
state to attend graduation ceremonies and football games, many students will naturally consider
these and other school events to be an important part of their educational experience in which
they may want very much to participate. Furthermore, although some extracurricular events
such as graduation ceremonies are not held frequently and the presence of parents may minimize
the potential for coercion, other events such as football games, pep rallies, club meetings, and
sports and academic awards ceremonies more closely resemble the classroom setting. The use of
ceremonial invocations at some extracurricular events, therefore, also will implicate the concerns
expressed by the Court in Edwards.
88. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793.
89. Id. at 794-95.
90. Id. at 795.
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single faith or belief. Rather, the analysis was framed to focus directly
on the content of the prayers at issue. 91 Thus, Judge Merritt's opinion
in Stein departed from the approach taken by the Supreme Court in
Marsh.92
Not only does the approach set forth by Judge Merritt in Stein by-
pass the threshold question of whether the prayer opportunity was be-
ing used to proselytize; the standards set forth to judge the content of
the prayer appear to be much more strict than those which would be
applied to legislative prayer under Marsh. For instance, although the
Supreme Court acknowledged in Lynch v. Donnelly,93 decided subse-
quent to Marsh, that the invocations delivered to the Congress retain
their "sacredness, '" 94 Judge Merritt's opinion emphasized that to pass
the Marsh test, the invocations must be civil or secularized, and must
not go beyond the "American civil religion." 9 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court also has noted that the invocations upheld in Marsh con-
stitute practices which are identified with one religious faith at least as
much as a nativity scene in the context of a Christmas display. 96 Yet
Judge Merritt indicated that any invocations, such as those in Stein,
which "employ the language of Christian theology and prayer,"
would violate the Marsh test. 97 That Judge Merritt established a much
more strict standard for addressing the use of ceremonial invocations
in the public schools than the Supreme Court set forth in Marsh indi-
cates the inadequacy of applying Marsh in the public school context.
91. Judge Merritt stated: "So long as the invocation or benediction.. . does not go beyond
the 'American civil religion,' so long as it preserves the substance of the principle of equal liberty
of conscience, no violation of the Establishment Clause occurs under the reasoning of Marsh."
Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409. Judge Merritt stated further that the prayers "should not be framed in
language that is unacceptable under Marsh, language that says to some parents and students: we
do not recognize your religious beliefs, our beliefs are superior to yours." Id. at 1410.
92. For an example of a more faithful application of the Marsh analysis, see Jager v. Doug-
las County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 835 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (Roney, C.J., dissenting). After
determining that Marsh should govern the constitutionality of the equal access plan at issue in
Jager, id. at 835-37, Chief Judge Roney applied the second part of the Marsh analysis. He rea-
soned that although the specific practice at issue could include the offering of prayers, "the
short duration of the invocations and the context in which they are delivered seem to alleviate
any risk that the invocations will be used to proselytize or convert." Id. at 837. He then con-
cluded that since the invocations served the purpose of providing a solemn opening to a public
event, and did not create the potential for indoctrination, the practice passed establishment
clause scrutiny under Marsh. Id. at 838.
93. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
94. Id. at 685.
95. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409.
96. The Court stated, "the creche is identified with one religious faith but no more so than
the examples we have set out from prior cases," and then cited Marsh as one of these examples.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685.
97. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1410.
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B. American Civil Religion Standard
The Sixth Circuit in Stein seemed troubled by the apparent inconsis-
tency of establishing an absolute ban on invocations at high school
graduation ceremonies while allowing ceremonial invocations before
other public bodies. 98 To resolve this tension, Judge Merritt stated
that prayers at graduation ceremonies would be permissible provided
they did not go beyond the American civil religion. 99
The concept of American civil religion was introduced into contem-
porary discussion by Robert N. Bellah in 1967.100 According to Bellah,
"there actually exists alongside of and rather clearly differentiated
from the churches an elaborate and well-institutionalized civil religion
in America."'' ° The tenets of American civil religion are not simply
those of Christianity, although Christianity does provide the source of
much of the civil religion's content.'°2 Rather, the civil religion em-
bodies a set of more general beliefs which relate the American politi-
cal experience to a "universal and transcendent religious reality." 3 It
expresses the notion that our founding fathers were motivated by a
desire to carry out God's will on earth. 04 It does not speak of Christ,
but of a "unitarian" God, yet a God "actively interested and involved
in history, with a special concern for America."' ' 5 According to Bel-
lah, the beliefs, symbols, and rituals through which the American civil
religion has been expressed "have played a crucial role in the develop-
ment of American institutions and still provide a religious dimension
for the whole fabric of American life, including the political
sphere." 106 The expression of civil religion in our public life is said to
98. This concern is evident in Judge Merritt's statement that "[tlo prohibit entirely the tra-
dition of invocations at graduation exercises while sanctioning the tradition of invocations for
judges, legislators and other public officials does not appear to be a consistent application of the
principle of equal liberty of conscience." Id.
99. Id.
100. Civil Religion, supra note 13, at 1247-48.
101. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 J. DAEDALus 1, 1 (1967).
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id. at 12.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id. at 7.
106. Id. at 3-4. Bellah suggested that the American civil religion is expressed in the references
to God in the Declaration of Independence, in Washington's first inaugural address, in Kenne-
dy's inaugural address, and in Lincoln's second inaugural address and Gettysburg Address. See
id. at 3-7. Other possible expressions of civil religion include the adoption of the phrase, "In
God We Trust" as the national motto, the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, and the
phrase, "God Save the United States and this Honorable Court" used to open the Supreme
Court's sessions. See Note, Developments-Religion and the State, 100 HARv. L. Rav. 1606,
1652 (1987) [hereinafter Developments-Religion and the State].
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fulfill a need for a sense of transcendent unity among the American
people and to legitimate the political order. 10 7
Judge Merritt's opinion in Stein cites no case precedent for the sug-
gestion that an American civil religion standard should be applied. 08
Significantly, although the Supreme Court in Marsh noted that the
Nebraska chaplain characterized his prayers as containing elements of
American civil religion,'09 nowhere in its Marsh opinion did the Court
indicate that American civil religion was the appropriate standard to
apply to ceremonial invocations." l0 Furthermore, although a number
of Supreme Court justices have discussed in dicta some of the numer-
ous references to God which occur in our public life, none of these
justices has expressly invoked the concept of American civil religion as
a basis for determining the constitutionality of these practices. For in-
stance, Justice O'Connor has explained that the references to God
found in the national motto, the invocation used to open the Supreme
Court's sessions, and the Pledge of Allegiance, are simply acknow-
ledgments of religion which serve the secular purpose of solemnizing
107. See Civil Religion, supra note 13, at 1250-53.
108. Although Judge Merritt cited to a recent Note proposing that the courts consider the
existence of American civil religion, and its differences from sacral religion, when deciding es-
tablishment clause cases, the Note did not propose that the American civil religion concept be
used as a standard of constitutionality. See Civil Religion, supra note 13, at 1255-57. The Note
suggests that courts should consider the different nature of exercises of civil religion and sacral
religion, but acknowledges, at least implicitly, that some practices of civil religion may need to
be modified in order to pass the establishment clause.
109. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14. -
110. One commentator states that Justice Burger alluded to the American civil religion con-
cept in Marsh "when [he] described the use of prayer in opening sessions of various public
bodies as 'deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country' and as having 'coexisted
with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom' since colonial times." Comment,
Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools-The American Civil Religion and the Establishment
Clause, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533, 543 (1988) (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786). The com-
mentator suggests that the Court in Marsh applied a historical practice test to uphold an exercise
of the American civil religion. Whether the Court in Marsh considered legislative prayer to be an
exercise of civil religion is unclear. However, considering the language of some of the prayers at
issue in Marsh, it is unlikely that Justice Burger would have had the American civil religion
concept in mind as a standard of adjudication. For instance, one of the prayers challenged in
Marsh included the following language:
Father in heaven, the suffering and death of your son brought life to the whole world
moving our hearts to praise your glory. The power of the cross reveals your concern
for the world and the wonder of Christ crucified.
The days of his life-giving death and glorious resurrection are approaching. This is
the hour when he triumphed over Satan's pride; the time when we celebrate the great
event of our redemption.
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 823 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Although the practice of ceremonially invoking God before a legislative session might be
within the civil religion, the sectarian prayer quoted above most likely would not. See Stein v.
Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406, 1416 n.9 (Wellford, J., dissenting) (observing that
the Senate chaplain's prayers often have contained language of Christian theology).
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public occasions.'" Former Chief Justice Burger has characterized
these practices as acknowledgments of the religious heritage of the
American people." 2 While Justice Brennan has indicated that he re-
mains uncertain with respect to the constitutionality of these practices,
he has suggested that they may be permissible on the basis that their
use is necessary to serve the secular function of inspiring commitment
and solemnizing public events coupled with their having lost any sig-
nificant religious content through rote repetition over the years." 3
Furthermore, Justice Black has emphasized the patriotic nature of
these types of practices." 4
Additionally, none of the lower federal courts that have addressed
the constitutionality of these practices has expressly employed the
American civil religion concept. These courts have rejected establish-
ment clause challenges to references to God in the national motto," 5
the national anthem," 6 and the Pledge of Allegiance," 7 finding that
the purpose and character of these practices is predominantly patriotic
and ceremonial, rather than religious. Such emphasis on the patriotic
nature and purpose of these practices raises the possibility that a type
of civil religion standard is being applied, implicitly if not expressly.
Thus, the potential usefulness of this concept as a standard for deter-
mining the constitutionality of using ceremonial invocations in the
public schools should be examined.
Two major difficulties emerge regarding the introduction of an
American civil religion standard into establishment clause jurispru-
dence. The first difficulty is that the concept is very complex,"" thus,
111. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 78 n.5 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676.
113. Id. at 716-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. After concluding that state-sponsored daily classroom prayer was unconstitutional,
Justice Black stated:
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with the
fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our
country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Independence
which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which
include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that
there are many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or
ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise
that the State of New York has sponsored in this instance.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962) (emphasis added).
115. O'Hair v. Blumenthal, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'g 462 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Tex.
1978); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970).
116. Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963).
117. Smith v. Denny, 280 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Cal. 1968).
118. Stahl, Coming to Terms: Defining Structures of Meaning in the Civil Religion and Na-
tionality Debates, 39 UNIo N SEM NARY Q. REv. 73 (1984).
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very difficult to define." 9 Russell Richey and Donald Jones have iden-
tified five different yet somewhat overlapping definitions. 20 Other
commentators have noted that "one of the limitations of Bellah's
transcendant universal model. . . is the absence of a precise definition
which distinguishes American civil religion from other religious forms
and from civil society,' ' 12' and that the concept of civil religion is of-
ten confused with public theology and nationalism. 2 2 Indeed, Bellah
himself appears to have changed his civil religion thesis from that
which he originally expressed in 1967,123 subsequently discerning two
types of civil religion: "general" and "special."' 124 Other scholars
have found it difficult to accept Bellah's claim that an institutional-
ized, well-developed, and differentiated civil religion actually exists in
America. 125 Considering the differences of opinion among scholars re-
garding a precise definition of the American civil religion concept, it is
doubtful that the concept would be useful as a standard by which to
adjudicate establishment clause cases. 126
The second difficulty is that, even if the American civil religion con-
cept were clearly defined, it is still not clear that the concept would be
an appropriate standard to apply in establishment clause cases. The
Supreme Court has made clear that the establishment clause protects
the right not only to select one religion over another, but also the right
to select nonreligion over religion. 127 At a minimum, American civil
119. Professor West stated in 1980 that "the term today has no one, clear definition." West,
A Proposed Neutral Definition of Civil Religion, 22 J. CHURCH & ST. 23, 23 (1980).
120. Jones & Richey, The Civil Religion Debate, in AMRcAN CrvL RELiGION 14-18 (R. Ri-
chey & D. Jones eds. 1974). These five kinds of civil religion include religion as folk religion, as
the transcendental universal religion of the nation, as religious nationalism, as democratic faith,
and as Protestant civic piety. Id.
121. Gehrig, The American Civil Religion Debate: A Source for Theory Construction, 20 J.
Sci. STrUo RELIGION 51, 54 (1981) (emphasis in original).
122. Stahl, supra note 118, at 73.
123. Handy, A Decisive Turn in the Civil Religion Debate, 37 THEOLOGY TODAY 342, 343
(1980).
124. Id.
125. See Wilson, A Historian's Approach to Civil Religion, in AmiCAN Civm RELGION
115-37 (R. Richey & D. Jones eds. 1974); Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L.
Rav. 701, 728 n.151 (1986).
126. See Comment, supra note 110, at 545 (absence of a precise definition of the American
civil religion concept would lead to inconsistency in establishment clause adjudication).
127. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
observed:
At one time it was thought that this right [to choose one's own creed] merely pro-
scribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would not require equal
respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian
faith such as Islam or Judaism. But when the underlying principle has been examined
in the crucible of litigation, the Court has unambiguously concluded that the individ-
ual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to
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religion is an expression of political ideas in religious terms that pre-
supposes the existence and involvement of God in our national life. 128
As a result, governmental practices expressive of civil religion may vi-
olate the establishment clause by endorsing religion and disapproving
of nonreligion. 129 Thus, even if courts could agree that a specific cere-
monial invocation did not go beyond the American civil religion, this
would not necessarily resolve the establishment clause issue.
C. The Lemon Test
Since neither the Marsh analysis nor an American civil religion stan-
dard should be applied to the use of ceremonial invocations in the
public schools, the vitality of the Lemon test will now be examined.
To pass the Lemon test, the government practice at issue must have a
secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion. 30 The Lemon test
has been applied in every establishment clause case since its formula-
tion with the single exception of Marsh.' Although the three-prong
Lemon analysis "is the only coherent test a majority of the Court has
ever adopted, ' '13 2 the test has still been the subject of criticism by both
select any religious faith or none at all.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("nothing in the Establish-
ment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion").
128. See Bellah, supra note 101, at 15 ('"God' has clearly been a central symbol in the civil
religion from the beginning and remains so today."); Gehrig, supra note 121, at 53 ("Central to
the American civil belief system are beliefs in the existence of God, in the American nation's
being subject to God's laws, and in the divine guidance and protection of the nation.") (footnote
omitted); West, supra note 119, at 38 ("[A] civil religion can be said to exist whenever the people
of any given nation believe in a transcendent, spiritual reality, believe that reality to be the
source of meaning and order for their nation, and express that belief and meaning in certain
public rituals, myths, and symbols."). Thus, expressions of American civil religion may go be-
yond merely acknowledging that religion was a motivating force in the lives of private indivi-
duals who shaped our history by actually presupposing the fact that God exists.
129. This is not to say that any governmental practice which expresses civil religion violates
the establishment clause, but rather that since some practices of civil religion may endorse relig-
ion or a particular religious belief, the concept should not be employed as a standard for the
adjudication of establishment clause cases. See Developments-Religion and the State, supra
note 106, at 1653 n.61 (1987) (observing that since governmental expressions of civil religion may
have religious as well as patriotic meaning, they may violate the establishment clause); Com-
ment, supra note 110, at 545-46 (since American civil religion bears the marks of Protestantism,
it may offend religious minorities).
130. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
131. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
132. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
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commentators' and members of the Court. Specifically, then-Associ-
ate Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Wallace v. Jaffree,3 4 reviewed the
history of the framing of the first amendment and concluded that the
Lemon test and the "wall of separation" theory on which it was
based, have no grounding in the history of the establishment clause.'"
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist would abandon the Lemon analysis al-
together. Both Justice White'36 and Justice Scalia17 have also ex-
pressed their dissatisfaction with the Lemon test and their willingness
to reassess its validity.
Justice O'Connor also has expressed some misgivings with
Lemon,' 18 but instead of totally abandoning the analysis, she has sug-
gested a reformulation of the test. 139 According to Justice O'Connor,
"the religious liberty protected by the Establishment Clause is in-
fringed when the government makes adherence to religion relevant to
a person's standing in the political community."' 4 The government
can make adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the
political community in two principal ways. First, if the government
becomes excessively entangled with religious institutions, this could ei-
ther interfere with the independence of the institutions or give the in-
stitutions access to the political process not fully shared by
nonadherents of the religion. Second, by either endorsing or disap-
proving of religion, the government can send a message to citizens
133. See, e.g., Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 17-23 (1978); Choper, The Reli-
gion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 680-83
(1980).
134. 472 U.S. 38, 91-106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Id.at l10.
136. Justice White stated:
Against [Justice Rehnquist's explication of the history of the religion clauses], it
would be quite understandable if we undertook to reassess our cases dealing with these
Clauses, particularly those dealing with the Establishment Clause. Of course, I have
been out of step with many of the Court's decisions dealing with this subject matter,
and it is thus not surprising that I would support a basic reconsideration of our prece-
dents.
Id. at 91 (White, J., dissenting).
137. Justice Scalia endorsed Justice Rehnquist's historical analysis with respect to the pur-
pose prong of Lemon. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), Justice O'Connor stated that "[i]t has never
been entirely clear ... how the three parts of the [Lemon] test relate to the principles enshrined
in the Establishment Clause." Id. at 688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985), Justice O'Connor noted that "[d]espite its initial promise, the Lemon test
has proved problematic." Id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Perhaps because I am new to the struggle, I am not ready to
abandon all aspects of the Lemon test.").
140. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that their adherence or nonadherence to religion will make a differ-
ence as to whether they are favored or disfavored members of the po-
litical community. Thus, under Justice O'Connor's reformulation,
"Lemon's inquiry as to the purpose and effect of a [government ac-
tion] requires courts to examine whether government's purpose is to
endorse religion and whether the [action] actually conveys a message
of endorsement." 1 41
The Eleventh Circuit in Jager concluded that the Lemon test gov-
erned the use of ceremonial invocations in the public schools, and ap-
plied Justice O'Connor's endorsement test to the question.142 The
Supreme Court has not expressly adopted Justice O'Connor's refor-
mulation of Lemon in place of the traditional Lemon test. 143 How-
ever, the Court has employed Justice O'Connor's "endorsement/
disapproval" language when applying the Lemon purpose and effect
prongs in a number of recent establishment clause cases.'" Thus, the
Lemon analysis-as reformulated by Justice O'Connor-is the appro-
priate standard to apply to the ceremonial invocation issue.
IV. APPLICATION OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S REFORMULATION OF THE
LEMON TEST
According to Justice O'Connor, the "purpose prong of the Lemon
test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disap-
prove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of gov-
ernment's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval."14 The entanglement prong
of Lemon requires that the government not become excessively entan-
gled with institutional religion. 146
141. Id. In addressing the effect of the government practice, "[t]he relevant issue is whether
an objective observer, acquainted with the [circumstances surrounding the government's action]
would perceive it as a state endorsement of [religion or a particular religious belief]." Id. at 76.
142. See Jager, 862 F.2d 824, 828-31 (11 th Cir. 1989).
143. Cf. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987) (applying traditional Lemon test).
144. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-89 (1986); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 389 (1985) (applying both traditional Lemon test and endorsement test); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985).
145. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 689. Justice O'Connor later expressed doubts about the validity of the entangle-
ment prong of the Lemon test. In Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), which followed Lynch,
she suggested that "[i]f a statute lacks a purpose or effect of advancing or endorsing religion, I
would not invalidate it merely because it requires some ongoing cooperation between church and
state or some state supervision to ensure that state funds do not advance religion." Id. at 430
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A. The Purpose Prong
Under the traditional Lemon analysis, the purpose prong is violated
only where no secular purpose exists for the governmental action. 147
Thus, governmental activity motivated in part by a secular purpose
and in part by a religious purpose could pass the purpose prong of
Lemon. 4 It is unclear whether the Supreme Court has retained this
principle in its application of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. In
both Wallace and Edwards, the Court concluded both that no legiti-
mate secular purpose existed for the government action and that the
purpose was to endorse religion.149 In Jager v. Douglas County School
District,150 however, the district court concluded that the school dis-
trict had three secular purposes for the invocation practice, but that
the school district also intended to endorse Protestant Christianity.
Thus, the question arises whether the existence of a legitimate secular
purpose satisfies the purpose prong even though an intent to endorse
religion also exists. Neither Justice O'Connor nor any other member
of the Court has qualified the endorsement test by, for instance, stat-
ing that where a government action is motivated by a legitimate secu-
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor's views about the entanglement prong may be analyzed in terms of cases
that deal with subsidies to religious organizations, and those that do not. For example, in Lynch,
which upheld the erection of a creche, Justice O'Connor accepted the entanglement prong but
limited the doctrine to "institutional" entanglement. Yet in Aguilar, which dealt with financial
aid to parochial schools, she "question[ed] the utility of entanglement as a separate Establish-
ment Clause standard in most cases." Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added). Although
Justice O'Connor may have intended to leave open the door to using the entanglement prong as
an independent constitutional test in cases that do not involve financial subsidies, it is unclear
whether she would apply an institutional entanglement test to the ceremonial invocations issue.
147. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2577 (to pass Lemon the legislature must have acted "with a
secular purpose") (emphasis added).
148. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 ("statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may
satisfy [the purpose prong]"). But see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1980) (although
state asserted secular purposes for posting copies of Ten Commandments in classrooms, Court
held that because the preeminent purpose was plainly religious, this practice violated Lemon's
purpose prong).
149. In Edwards, Justice Brennan concluded that "because the primary purpose of the [gov-
ernmental action was] to endorse a particular religious doctrine, [it] further[ed] religion in viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause." 107 S. Ct. at 2583. Yet he also emphasized that the petitioner
had "identified no clear secular purpose" for the government action. Id. at 2578. In Wallace,
Justice Stevens stated:
In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask "whether government's actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion." In this case the answer to that ques-
tion is dispositive. For the record not only provides us with an unambiguous affirma-
tive answer, but it also reveals that the enactment of the [challenged statute] was not
motivated by any clearly secular purpose-indeed, the statute had no secular purpose.
472 U.S. at 56 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
150. 862 F.2d 824, 829 (11 th Cir. 1989).
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lar purpose as well as a purpose to endorse religion the purpose prong
is still satisfied. Since the purpose prong of the endorsement test has
been consistently stated in unqualified terms, a finding that one of the
purposes of the government was to endorse religion should constitute
a violation of the purpose prong. 5'
Applying this understanding of the purpose prong to the practices
at issue in Jager v. Douglas County School District 5 2 and Stein v.
Plainwell Community Schools'53 will illustrate how the purpose prong
works. The district court in Jager found that the actual purposes for
opening the football games with an invocation included three secular
purposes, but also included an intent to endorse Protestant Christian-
ity.'54 Assuming the district court's findings were not clearly errone-
ous, the Eleventh Circuit properly held that the practice violated the
purpose prong of Lemon.'
The district court in Stein noted that the record contained no clear
articulation of the purpose of the school districts for including the
invocations in the graduation ceremonies . 5 6 However, the court
gleaned from the stipulation of facts that the school districts had two
secular purposes for including the invocations. First, the schools were
following a long tradition of using the invocation to provide a solemn
opening for the ceremonies. Second, the schools were permitting the
students to plan or participate in their own commencement exer-
cises.'17 The district court also stated its view that it was the school
district's purpose for including the practice in the graduation, rather
than the purpose of the person actually delivering the invocation,
which was relevant to the purpose prong analysis.' Thus, the court
reasoned that since ceremonial invocations have a dual nature in that
they are both religious and ceremonial, the purpose of the government
was not necessarily religious simply by virtue of the fact that the prac-
151. See Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modification of the
Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 471 (preferring
Justice O'Connor's version of the intent prong over the traditional intent prong because Justice
O'Connor's version invalidates any practice motivated by an intent to endorse religion even
though a secular intent also exists, whereas the traditional intent prong is satisfied as long as the
practice is not wholly motivated by religious purposes).
152. 862 F.2d 824 (llth Cir. 1989).
153. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
154. 862 F.2d at 829.
155. Id. at 830. The Eleventh Circuit based its conclusion on its determination that the
school district was most interested in the religious purpose for the practice. Id. However, since
one of the purposes for the practice was to endorse religion, this finding should have been suffi-
cient in and of itself to violate the purpose prong.
156. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 610 F. Supp. 43, 47 (W.D. Mich.1985), rev'd,
822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
157. Id. at 48.
158. Id. at 47.
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tice contemplated the offering of a prayer. 5 9 Having found two secu-
lar purposes for the practice and no evidence of an intent to endorse
religion by the school districts, the district court held the practices did
not violate the purpose prong. ,60
The district court's reasoning in Stein differs from language in the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Jager. The Eleventh Circuit indicated
that the purpose for an invocation practice which permits prayer
would have to be religious since prayer is inherently religious. 161 Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit suggests that an invocation practice would violate
the purpose prong of Lemon regardless of whether any evidence of an
intent to endorse religion exists.
The district court's analysis in Stein is the proper approach. As
Justice O'Connor has explained, the intent of government is examined
because some people may discern this actual intent, even though the
message actually conveyed is different. 162 Thus, the first prong focuses
on the government's actual subjective intent in authorizing a certain
activity, which may not be obvious simply from the religious nature of
the activity. This is especially true with regard to ceremonial invoca-
tions which also have a ceremonial nature and purpose that is distinct
from a prayer's religious function. 63 Thus, when conducting this first
inquiry, the courts should scrutinize the subjective intent of the gov-
ernmental entity which sanctioned the prayer to determine whether a
purpose to endorse religion exists. If no such purpose is found, and
the government expresses a bona fide and plausible secular purpose
for the practice,' 64 the practice should not be struck down based on
the first prong of Lemon.
B. The Effect Prong
When addressing the moment of silence statute at issue in Wallace
v. Jaffree,165 Justice O'Connor stated that the inquiry under the effect
159. See id.
160. Id. at 50.
161. Jager, 862 F.2d at 830 ("an intrinsically religious practice cannot meet the secular pur-
pose prong of the Lemon test").
162. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163. See Stein, 610 F. Supp. at 47-48; see also Comment, Invoking the Presence of God at
Public High School Graduation Ceremonies: Graham v. Central Community School District, 71
IOWA L. REV. 1247, 1257-58 (1986) (reasoning that the court in Graham v. Central Community
School Dist., 698 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985), failed to recognize the dual nature of gradua-
tion invocations).
164. Justice O'Connor has stated that the courts should defer to a government entity's ex-
pression of a plausible secular purpose. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring). However, she has also explained that the courts should distinguish "a sham
secular purpose from a sincere one," and that in a close case, the inquiry into the effect prong of
Lemon might help the court decide on the purpose question. Id. at 75.
165. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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prong of Lemon was "whether an objective observer, acquainted with
the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would
perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools."' 6
Since the decision to include an invocation at a school event generally
is not statutory, Justice O'Connor's statement would presumably re-
quire a court to examine the records of discussions concerning the de-
cision to establish or continue the practice, any written statements or
guidelines concerning the practice, and the manner in which the deci-
sion was implemented when determining whether an objective ob-
server would perceive the practice as an endorsement of religion.
To address this formulation of the effect prong, two of its elements
must be clarified. First, it must be determined whether a court should
take the perspective of an adherent or a nonadherent of the religious
beliefs implicated by the practice at issue since the endorsement ques-
tion could easily turn on which of these perspectives is taken. 67 Be-
cause the purpose of Justice O'Connor's test is to ensure that the
government does not convey to nonadherents the message that their
beliefs are disfavored, 68 the courts should assume the nonadherent's
perspective when examining the message conveyed by a government
practice.'6 9
Second, it is unclear precisely how the legislative history and other
factors surrounding the decision to have an invocation should influ-
ence the effect prong analysis. Although Justice O'Connor has stated
that the objective observer should be imputed with knowledge of the
"legislative history" and text of a challenged government policy, as
well as the manner in which the policy was implemented, taking this
approach drains the effect prong of any independent function. An ob-
jective observer acquainted with this information will reach, the same
conclusion as to whether the government is conveying a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion that the court will reach when
166. Id. at 76.
167. See Developments-Religion and the State, supra note 106, at 1647-48 ("The objective
observer approach ... may allow a finding for or against a government action, depending on
whether the action is viewed from the perspective of the accommodated majority or from the
perspective of the outsider who does not share the accommodated beliefs.").
This principle may be illustrated to some extent by comparing Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in Lynch with Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. Justice Brennan appears to have
examined the creche from the perspective of a nonadherent. "The effect on minority religious
groups, as well as on those who may reject all religion, is to convey the message that their views
are not similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to public support." Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor seems not to have employed
this distinction in her analysis as she phrased the inquiry as what "viewers may fairly understand
to be the purpose of the display." Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
168. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
169. Developments-Religion and the State, supra note 106, at 1648.
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conducting the intent prong analysis. 70 The need to examine the pur-
pose and effect prongs separately derives from the recognition that
when government speaks the message actually received by some mem-
bers of the audience may-and often does-differ from the intended
message.17' Since this is the underlying purpose for conducting the in-
tent analysis separately from the effect analysis, it seems that the ob-
server of the practice should not be imputed with detailed knowledge
of the specific circumstances surrounding the school district's decision
to have an invocation practice.
Thus, when examining the message conveyed by a school's practice
of opening events with an invocation, courts should take the perspec-
tive of an objective observer in the audience who does not adhere to
the religious beliefs implicated by the practice, and who is not im-
puted with detailed knowledge of the legislative history of the school
district's decision to have the invocation. Taking this perspective, it
will be difficult to conclude that the sanctioning of invocations at
public school events, regardless of the content of the invocations, is
permissible. Unlike other public references to God, such as the na-
tional motto or the Pledge of Allegiance, which by rote repetition over
the years have likely lost much of their religious content, 7 2 invoca-
tions are inherently religious exercises, 7 1 the content of which changes
with each new speaker. It is difficult to conceive of the offering of an
invocation which would not be perceived by nonadherents as a mes-
sage of endorsement of religion. 7 4 Accordingly, as the Eleventh Cir-
170. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the
No "Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 293-94 (1987).
171. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
172. See id. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
I would suggest that such practices as the designation of "In God We Trust" as our
national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the
flag can best be understood ... as a form a [sic] "ceremonial deism," protected from
Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition
any significant religious content.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
173. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing
sponsored vocal prayer from moment of silence in that moment of silence is not inherently relig-
ious); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 811 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Prayer is relig-
ion in act. Praying means to take hold of a word, the end, so to speak, of a line that leads to
God.") (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962)
(denominationally neutral prayer composed by New York, "a solemn avowal of divine faith and
supplication for the blessings of the Almighty," is obviously religious in nature).
Although an invocation as defined earlier, supra note 2, is inherently religious because it is a
prayer to a divine being, the use of an inspirational speech to open public high school events
would not be inherently religious.
174. Professor Loewy's application of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test to the Supreme
Court's invocation of "God Save the United States and this Honorable Court" illustrates how a
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cuit indicated in Jager v. Douglas County School District, 17  the
practice of having invocations at public high school events should be
held unconstitutional based on the effect prong of Lemon, regardless
of the content of a particular invocation.1 76
C. The Entanglement Prong
The third prong of the Lemon test requires that government not
become excessively entangled with religion.'" The entanglement prong
"reflect[s] the Madisonian concern that secular and religious authori-
ties must not interfere with each other's respective spheres of choice
and influence.' ' 7 8 The prong has two general strands: administrative
entanglement and political divisiveness.' 79 Since the Court has indi-
cated that the political divisiveness inquiry applies only to cases in-
volving direct financial subsidies to religious institutions, 80 only the
administrative entanglement strand is implicated by the ceremonial in-
vocation issue when the speaker is not monetarily compensated.
The administrative entanglement prong has most often been ad-
dressed in cases involving government aid to religious institutions.'8'
nonadherent is likely to perceive such an invocation:
[P]osit a nontheist (either litigant or visitor) in the gallery of the Supreme Court. How
is such a person to react to the invocation? Consider how you would react to one or
more of the following hypothetical invocations: "Christ save the United States and
this Honorable Court"; "The Pope bless the United States and this Honorable
Court"; "Allah save the United States and this Honorable Court"; "Satan save the
United States and this Honorable Court."
Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause:
The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REv. 1049, 1055 (1986).
175. 862 F.2d 824 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
176. This .result also avoids the problems created by an analysis which requires the courts to
examine the language of particular invocations to determine their validity. See Comment, Stein
v. Plainwell Community Schools: The Constitutionality of Prayer in Public High School Com-
mencement Exercises, 22 GA. L. Rav. 469, 496-97 n.96 (1988).
177. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
178. L. TREBE, AmicIcAN CONSTrruTONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1226 (2d ed. 1988); see also
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (entanglement with
religious institutions "may interfere with the independence of the institutions, give the institu-
tions access to government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the
religion, and foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines") (cita-
tion omitted).
179. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-15, 622; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 798-99 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684; Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 n.11 (1983).
181. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2577-78 (1988) (federal funding under
the Adolescent Family Life Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578 (1981), of organizations with
institutional ties to religious organizations); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-13 (1985) (fed-
eral funding used to pay salaries of public employees to teach in parochial schools); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762-67 (1976) (annual grants to private institutions of
higher learning including church-related colleges); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-22 (financial aid to
church-related elementary and secondary schools).
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The Court's concern in these cases has been that the government sur-
veillance necessary to ensure that the aid does not have the effect of
advancing or endorsing religion could lead the government to trespass
into the spiritual realm.'82 Chief Justice Rehnquist,'83 Justice O'Con-
nor, 84 and Justice White'85 have criticized the entanglement prong on
the ground that the very state supervision of religious organizations
required to ensure compliance with the Lemon effect prong renders a
program unconstitutional based on the entanglement prong. Since the
Court has continued to apply the entanglement prong in recent
cases,'186 however, the entanglement inquiry must still be addressed.
A ceremonial invocation practice could raise both the concern that
the state may intrude into the spiritual realm, and that the church may
intrude into the governmental realm. In Marsh v. Chambers,5 7 Justice
Brennan raised the former concern in relation to the Nebraska legisla-
ture's practice of opening its legislative sessions with an invocation.
He concluded that the process of choosing a suitable chaplain, and
ensuring that the chaplain said suitable prayers when opening the leg-
islative sessions, involved the very kind of government supervision of
church officials that the entanglement prong was intended to avoid.18
Similarly, where a school board monitors the selection of invocation
speakers or the content of the invocations, the board has trespassed
into the spiritual realm, thereby violating the entanglement prong.
A ceremonial invocation practice could also raise the second entan-
glement prong concern that religious institutions not trespass into the
governmental sphere. In Lynch v. Donnelly,' 9 the Court suggested
182. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620 (monitoring required by the Rhode Island program
created a "relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church
schools and hence of churches").
183. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (entangle-
ment prong creates .'Catch-22' paradox"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109-10 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (entanglement prong should be eliminated along with the rest of the
Lemon test).
184. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 429-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (entanglement prong
has led to "anomalous results" and should not be an independent test of constitutionality, but
should remain relevant to the effect prong analysis).
185. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767-70 (1976) (White, J., concur-
ring) (entanglement prong is "insolubly paradoxical" and should be eliminated from Lemon
test); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 664-71 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2577-78 (1988); Corporation of Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2870 (1987); Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-14. Cf. Witters v. Wash-
ington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489-90 & n.5 (1986) (declining to address
entanglement prong as a prudential matter because the question was not addressed by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court below, but noting that the state court may choose to consider the question
on remand).
187. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
188. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798-99 & n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
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that the degree of control exercised by church authorities over the
content or design of a city's nativity scene in its Christmas display
might reach a level that violates the entanglement prong. Lynch sug-
gests that a ceremonial invocation practice could violate the entangle-
ment prong where a school board involves church authorities in the
selection of speakers or in the monitoring of the content of the invo-
cations.
Neither the equal access plan in Jager v. Douglas County School
District,'9° nor the Plainwell graduation ceremony practice in Stein v.
Plainwell Community Schools,' 9' directed the school boards to moni-
tor the content of the invocations or involved church authorities in
selecting invocation speakers. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit in Jager92
and the district court in Stein 93 properly held that these practices did
not violate the entanglement prong. However, under the traditional
invocation practice in Jager, the school board delegated the task of
selecting invocation speakers to the Douglas County Ministerial Asso-
ciation.' 94 Since this practice raises both entanglement prong concerns,
the Eleventh Circuit in Jager properly concluded that the traditional
invocation practice violated the entanglement prong. 95
An invocation practice may or may not violate the entanglement
prong, depending on the attributes of the specific practice at issue.
However, courts may choose not to fully engage in an entanglement
prong analysis because the effect prong of the Lemon test should be
dispositive.
V. CONCLUSION
The inclusion of an invocation at public high school events seems to
be a widespread practice. Thus, the question of whether this practice
violates the establishment clause is an important one for public school
districts throughout the country. The difference in the approaches
taken by the Sixth Circuit in Stein and by the Eleventh Circuit in Ja-
ger has created some uncertainty concerning the proper analytical
framework which should be applied to this issue, and whether a prop-
erly worded prayer would pass constitutional muster.
190. 862 F.2d 824, 827 (11th Cir. 1989).
191. 822 F.2d 1406, 1407 (6th Cir. 1987).
192. See Jager, 862 F.2d at 831.
193. See Stein, 610 F. Supp. 43, 50 (W.D. Mich. 1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
194. Jager, 862 F.2d at 834.
195. Id. Since ceremonial invocation practices in public high schools should not pass the
effect prong of Justice O'Connor's reformulated Lemon test, see supra notes 165-76, courts
should not have to address the entanglement prong on this issue.
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Of the three approaches which have been suggested, Justice O'Con-
nor's reformulation of Lemon appears to be the standard the Court is
most likely to apply to the ceremonial invocation issue. Yet settling on
this standard does not resolve the question. The resolution of this is-
sue under O'Connor's endorsement test also depends on whether a
court views the practice from the perspective of an adherent or a non-
adherent of the religious beliefs implicated by the practice. Since the
purpose of the endorsement test is to ensure that the government not
convey to nonadherents the message that their beliefs are disfavored,
the courts should examine the practice of having ceremonial invoca-
tions from the perspective of nonadherents. Taking this approach
should lead the courts to hold unconstitutional the practice of includ-
ing invocations at public high school events.

